Mapping Pakistan's foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Disinformation Operations Against India.

The expanding role of foreign media and X influencers in the wake of Operation Sindoor

In the era of internet age, the arena of conflict has extended beyond conventional borders, with strategic competition,cyber warfare, and manipulation of information in the digital domain. In such a contested and hostile digital environment, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) is one such threat that endangers the democratic institutions, its political process, social harmony as well as national security.

The term FIMI, or Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, was first introduced by the European Union in 2015 to analyse the Russian disinformation operation against Ukraine and the European Union. It is identified as a potent, low-cost, and high-impact tool used by authoritarian regimes or malign actors to destabilise democracies, weaken public trust, and distort international discourse, without crossing a single physical boundary. However, FIMI is no longer only confined to the practice of authoritarian regimes, since now most of the countries weaponise FIMI to undermine the sovereignty of other countries by abusing the information environment. .

What distinguishes FIMI from traditional propaganda is its intent and impact. FIMI does not aim simply to persuade. Instead, it seeks to confuse, divide, and destabilise societies by exploiting social tensions and eroding trust in democratic institutions and independent media. Most importantly, it involves the activities of state and state-linked actors, who are deliberately manipulating the information environment in deceptive, misleading, or coercive ways to undermine public trust, weaken democratic systems, and advance geopolitical objectives.

Why is it at Stake?

In the case of India, FIMI threats originating from Pakistan and China constitute a sustained and multi-domain offensive that exploits the country’s open digital ecosystem to undermine democratic institutions, erode political and military leadership, social harmony and distort strategic decision-making. These activities pose a profound threat to India’s democratic order, national security, foreign policy autonomy, and social cohesion. Pakistan has long operationalised information warfare through a diffuse but coordinated network of the ISI, ISPR, diplomatic channels, proxy media, diaspora influencers, and ideological NGOs.

This apparatus systematically, for example, seeks to internationalise the Kashmir issue, fracture India’s social cohesion, and tarnish its democratic image on global platforms. As for instance, in the wake of Operation Sindoor and its aftermath, Pakistan has launched a massive disinformation and misinformation campaign in the various social media platforms such as X(former Twitter).

Key Findings:

During the Operation Sindoor and Post-Pahalgam terror attack, Pakistan launched a sophisticated FIMI disinformation campaign against India, through various communications channels.
Identification of Islamabad’s strategic objectives and the specific goals underpinning its FIMI activities, illustrated through empirical examples.
Islamabad instrumentalised foreign media outlets and influential X personalities to amplify their disinformation and misinformation efforts.
Pakistan, China, Azerbaijan and Turkey’s strategic partnership assisted in amplification of Pakistan narratives across its state-aligned and linked channels. .
Uncovered Turkey and Pakistan covert operations, a coordinated propaganda in the field of media dating back to 2014.
Pakistan has weaponised “Misinformation’ to maximise the impact of its disinformation operations.

Policy Recommendation:

To effectively counter FIMI operations and campaigns, India must shift from a fragmented, reactive posture to a proactive, institutionalised, integrated and multi domain national strategy.

  • Develop a tailored FIMI concept and comprehensive framework of India
  • Establish a National Strategic Communications centre
  • Diversify the functions of the PIB’s Fact Checking Unit (FCU)
  • Advance Research-Led institutional capacity to counter FIMI
  • Integrate FIMI Disinformation mechanism into National Education and Media Literacy
  • Enact a dedicated FIMI legislation
  • International Cooperation

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